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This paper aims at contributing to the literature on the determinants of patent value in two 
respects. It first puts forward new potential determinants of patent value which are mainly 
related to the identification of the institutional sources of knowledge and the geographical 
scope of patenting strategy. Second, it aims at validating the traditional and new determinants 
of patent value with academic patents. The empirical analysis focuses on 208 patent families 
applied by six main Belgian Universities. The patent value is approximated by the number of 
forward patent citations. The estimates confirm the role of most traditional determinants of 
patent value (e.g., backward citation and family size). Further, the new indicators underline 
the importance of identifying the institutional sources of knowledge. They provide a more in-
depth view on the way non patent citations, backward patent citations, co-assignees, and the 
geographical scope for protection determine patent value. Policy implications emerge from 
these results, such as the benefit of local and international collaboration between public 
research organisations and the need to convince academic researchers with a high scientific 
profile in terms of publications to crystallize their tacit knowledge into high value academic 
patents.  
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Patents have been used to measure innovation performances for many years. They have been 
used as indicator of R&D output, as vector of knowledge spillovers, as a tool to assess the 
direction or strategy of research and as macroeconomic indicators of technological 
performances.
1 However the simple count of patents provides a highly biased view of the 
innovation reality, because their value distribution is highly skewed, as illustrated by 
Griliches (1990) and Scherer and Harhoff (2000) for instance. On average it is said that only 
one to three patents out of one hundred yield significant financial returns. This skewed 
distribution of patent value is at the origin of a small but burgeoning stream of economic 
research.  
 
The main objective of this field of research is to identify the determinants of patent value. In 
this respect, forward patent citations (the number of citations a patent receives from more 
recent patents) has been identified as a major determinant of patent value. The other most 
important determinants are the family size (geographical scope for protection) and backward 
patent citations (the number of citations to previous patents). Several other potential 
determinants have been put forward recently. 
 
The objective of this paper is to contribute to this literature on patent value. The contribution 
is twofold. It first aims at suggesting new determinants of patent value. These new indicators 
consist in improving the existing indicators (non patent citations, backward patent citations, 
co-assignees and family size) by formally identifying the related institutional sources of 
knowledge. Second, it aims at testing the validity of the traditional and new determinants of 
patent value with academic patents. Most of the existing literature focuses on business related 
patent applications. In the present analysis the focus is put on 208 patent families applied at 
the EPO (European Patent Office) by six Belgian universities. 
 
This particular focus on academic patents finds its justification in the radical change observed 
in the patenting activity of Belgian universities since the early nineties. The number of patents 
has exploded since the late nineties, as witnessed by the filing of 142 patent families by the 
six universities, more than five times the number of patent families applied for during the late 
eighties period. One can further wonder whether these new academic patents have the same 
value determinants than the patents applied by the business sector. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the existing literature on patent 
value. In the light of this literature section 3 suggests four new sets of potential indicators of 
patent value. The database and some basic indicators are presented in section 4. Section 5 
concerns the empirical implementation and defines the various models that are used to 
identify the determinants of academic patent value. The empirical results are presented and 
interpreted in section 6. The last section concludes and provides some policy implications 
induced by our results. The results show that the new indicators related to the institutional 
sources of knowledge allow to improve our understanding of what determines the value of 
patents. 
                                                 
1 See e.g.,  Grilikes (1990) and Grilikes et al. (1986).   3 
2.  The literature on patent value 
 
 
The skewed distribution is the main reason underlying the recent development of a literature 
specialised in the evaluation of patent value. Most of the empirical analyses in this field are 
summarized in table 1, and table 2. 
 
It clearly appears that several empirical strategies have been used to approximate the value of 
patent. The existing studies listed in table 2 are not always comparable. They rely on different 
dataset (e.g. all patent applications in a regional office vs. a particular sector like biotech vs. a 
sample of firms in a given country), over various time span and with different data sources.  
 
In addition, the functional forms of the empirical models vary from one study to the other. 
Some authors rely on the monetary value of each patent (Harhoff et al., 1999, 2002), on 
forward patent citations (Lerner, 1994), on a composite indicator (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 
1999), on the probability to get a patent granted (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2000), on 
patent opposition and renewal data (Pakes and Simpson, 1989 and, Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 1997), and on whether a high-tech start-up has been created or not on the basis 
of the codified invention (Shane, 2001). As a matter of fact there are as many potential 
methodologies to approximate the value of patent as the number of existing investigations. 
 
Similarly, the type and the number of explanatory variables that have been used as 
determinants of patent value are heterogeneous across studies. The most frequently used 
determinants are forward patent citations (when is not used as dependent variable), backward 
patent citation and the geographical scope for protection (number of countries in the patent 
family). Other variables rely on the concepts of opposition procedures, renewal data
2, 
application scope (claims) and non patent citations. 
 
*** Insert table 1 around here *** 
 
Despite this strong heterogeneity across studies, some similarities emerge. The most 
important one is probably the fact that forward patent citations (FPC) are closely associated 
with the value of a patent. All studies using forward patent citations reach this conclusion. In 
a similar vein, indicators of the geographical scope of protection of a patent (or family size) 
are closely related with patent value (see the bottom line of table 2). 
 
Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999) develop a composite quality index significantly related to 
the decisions to renew and to defend a patent. They point out that forward citations and family 
size were important determinants to renewal decision but claims and backward citations were 
not. In the field of Computed Tomography scanners, Trajtenberg (1990) showed a close 
association between indicators based on forward patent citations (the number of citations from 
more recent patents) and independent measures of the social value of innovation in that field. 
Harhoff et al. (1999) also established for a set of German patented inventions that patents 
with greater economic value are more likely to be cited in subsequent patents. 
 
A third indicator that has often been used and has received some substantial empirical 
validation is based on backward patent citations (BPC, the number of former patent cited by 
                                                 
2 Schankerman & Pakes (1986) developed a model of patent renewal, considering that patent renewal decisions 
illustrate the value of a patent protection. Within four technology groups, Lanjouw et al. (1996) also used patent 
renewal to estimate a patent value index.   4 
the inventors). Only two studies out of six studies using this indicator found that it has no 
significant impact on patent value.  
 
*** Insert table 2 around here *** 
 
Besides these three main indicators the other potential determinants that have been 
incorporated in patent valuation models have either led to conflicting results or received very 
little empirical validation. The biggest bone of contention concerns the scope of the invention 
(approximated by the number of claims and/or the number of technological classes associated 
with the invention).  
 
On the one hand, Lerner (1994) examines how patent scope affects the valuation of new 
biotechnology firms. He finds that an increasing scope (measured by the number of four-digit 
IPC –International Patent Classification- classes into which patents are classified) of patent 
protection is associated with higher valuations. Focusing the MIT’s patent applications, Shane 
(2001) also demonstrates that the scope, the radicalness and the importance of MIT’s patents 
have a significant and positive impact on the probability to create new technology-based firms. 
However, the valuable impact of the patent’s scope is disputed by many authors, including 
Harhoff et al. (2002), Harhoff and Reitzig (2002) Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2000, 2002) 
and Lanjouw and Schankerman (1997). The scope is sometimes inversely correlated with 
patent value, at least when measured with the number of technology class listed. 
 
Tong and Frame (1994) put forward the number of claims as a measure of the size of an 
invention. Lanjouw and Schankerman (1997, 1999) show however that this indicator is 
related to the probability of litigation but not to the probability of being renewed. 
 
The indicator based on non patent citations (NPC), or citations to the scientific literature has 
not been used extensively so far. Meyer (2000) underlines how important scientific tacit 
knowledge is important for inventive activity in certain fields: scientific findings are 
important background knowledge playing an important indirect rather than a direct role. 
However he argues that non-patent citations hardly represent a direct link between cited paper 
and citing patent. Experimental results vary. Analysing a set of German patent applied in 
1977 and fully renewed until 1995, Harhoff et al. (2002) establish a significant positive 
impact of scientific citations on the monetary value of the patents. In another study, Harhoff 
and Reitzig (2002), investigating biotechnology and pharmaceutical patents, do not observe a 
significant influence of the number of non-patent citations on the probability that a patent will 
be opposed (considered as a value indicator). 
 
In a nutshell, it clearly appears from the literature survey that the number of forward patent 
citations is one of the most important determinants of patent value. It is closely followed by  
the family size and backward citations. The scope of an invention has an ambiguous impact 
whereas non patent citations received little empirical support. One objective of this paper is to 
put forward more detailed indicators that would improve our understanding of patent value. 





3.  New indicators of patent value 
   5 
 
The central hypothesis that we put forward is that a more precise definition of the components 
of the existing value determinants might improve our understanding of what determines 
patent value. Most indicators reflect to some extent a broad source of knowledge : non patent 
citations are deemed to approximate the science base of an invention; backward patent 
citations reflect the codified origin of the technological knowledge used for an invention; the 
co-assignees indicators potentially measure the extent to which different sources of tacit 
knowledge have been merged in a single research objective; and patent family size witnesses 
the financial resources used to extend the intellectual property abroad. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates how these four indicators might be improved through a more precise 
‘institutional’ typology. We put forward that if these indicators broadly reflect the sources of 
knowledge that have been used to invent a patent, they might be improved through a formal 
identification of their institutional origins. Similarly, the number of countries chosen for the 
international protection phase can be disaggregated into some strategic geographical choices. 
 
*** Insert figure 1 around here *** 
 
The scientific sources of knowledge, or non patent citations, have been little investigated in 
the literature, and no conclusive result has emerged. However, an important distinction can be 
made between self citations and non-self citations to the scientific literature (see the Eastern 
quadrant of figure 1). Self citations to the scientific literature can be assumed to represent an 
invention that is based on the researcher’s (or the team’s) own scientific and tacit knowledge. 
Non-self citations would have a lower potential impact on the value of an invention for two 
main reasons. First, it is a citation that is available to all inventors and is therefore open to 
competition from the rest of the world (scientific publications are in the public domain). Self 
citations also refer to the public domain but implicitly mean a large potential tacit knowledge 
associated with a substantial – and recognised- experience in the field of research. It can be 
assumed that an inventor that uses its own tacit knowledge (part of which has been published) 
is more likely to translate it into a successful invention. Second, it is well known that a 
substantial proportion of citations is imposed by patent examiners. These citations, although 
indubitably related to the field of research, would not have any, or at most very little, direct 
influence on the quality, and hence value, of an invention. Self citations would always appear 
in the patents (few scientists or researchers would forget to cite their own work), without any 
intervention from a third party. 
 
Backward patent citations (the Western Quadrant of figure 1), or the technological source of 
knowledge, has been extensively validated as an indicator of patent value. The inventions that 
cites backward inventions are either architectural (i.e., merger of different technologies) or 
incremental (improvement of an existing invention). In the former case one can expect a 
higher value of the invention. In the latter case it depends on the incremental step. A small 
increment would probably be associated with a lower return than a large increment. The only 
information that allows to differentiate the cited inventions relates to their institutional origins. 
A cited patent can be applied by a public research institution (the invention is sourced from 
the scientific community), by a private firm (the invention is sourced from an invention that is 
being potentially exploited by the firm), or by the research team itself (self backward 
citations). 
 
The relationship between these three institutional sources of technological knowledge and the 
quality or value of an invention (whether it is incremental or architectural) is far from being   6 
clear-cut. It can be expected, however, that the patents that cite other patents invented by 
public research organisations (PRI) are more related to the scientific field and face less 
potential competition on the final product market than the cited patents that have been applied 
by a firm (firm use patent for exploitation or licensing purposes). Self backward citations 
would relate more (implicitly) to incremental inventions and would therefore reflect mainly 
incremental inventions that would in turn be associated with a lower potential value. 
 
The number of co-assignees (Southern quadrant of figure 1) has been little investigated as 
determinant of patent value in the literature. Nevertheless, it reflects either an active research 
collaboration, and/or a contractual research and/or an independent research project but whose 
intellectual property has been applied for by one of the co-assignees in order to commercialize 
the invention or license it. Co-assignees can be firms or public research institutions. The 
former type of co-assignee would witness either an active collaboration in research or a 
contractual research. The potential effect of these co-assignees is unclear. If it is purely a 
contractual research for the development of an invention one might expect a lower potential 
value (otherwise the research project would be implemented by the firm so as to avoid any 
potential knowledge leakages). On the other hand, if it is performed under a collaborative 
framework, where two knowledge bases and research skills are merged, one might expect a 
higher impact on the value of the invention. If the co-assignee is a public research institution a 
higher potential value can be expected as the knowledge-base of the invention would be 
related to more research efforts from the scientific sector. 
 
The fourth indicator of patent value is the geographical scope of protection, or family size 
(Northern quadrant in figure 1). This indicator suggests that a patent that has been applied for 
in several countries is associated with a much higher value than a patent applied only in one 
country or region. However, countries differ markedly in terms of both size and technological 
intensity. It might therefore be expected that a patent extended to the US (for non US 
applicants) is more valuable than a patent applied only to the Australian market for instance. 
From a European viewpoint, this assumption can be tested by simply looking at the patents 
that have been applied in the United States and/or Japan, by far the largest ‘homogenous’ 
markets in the world. 
 
 
4.  The Database on academic patents in Belgium 
 
 
Since 1985, Belgian universities have increasingly invested in the protection of their 
intellectual property.  To assess this evolution, patent data have been collected in July 2002 
through the DELPHION online database. In a first stage, the patents applied by the 19 Belgian 
universities or university faculty centres
3 were gathered. In a second stage the focus has been 
put on the six most productive universities in term of patent applications.
4 This study does not 
display the patents that have been invented at university but applied by another assignee 
5.  
                                                 
3 The universities from the French-speaking community are: Ulg, UCL, ULB, UMH, FUSAGx, FUNDP, FPMs, 
FUSL, FUCaM, FUL. The universities from the Flemish community: KUL, LUC, KUB, UA, RUCA, UFSIA, 
UIA, UG, VUB. Acronyms are defined in Annex 1. 
4 For the period 1985-1999, the KUL, UG, VUB, UCL, ULB and Ulg were holding 94% of the identified 
Belgian universities’ patents. 
5 Saragossi and van Pottelsberghe (2003) show that the risk of having a wrong picture of patentable research 
looking exclusively at the patent filed by the universities is extremely high. It must be noticed that universities 
may use different names to file their patents. For instance KUL has used many names like KULeuven, R&D   7 
 
The patents were grouped in families. A patent family is the set of patents characterised by the 
same priority number. To take into account only the potentially most valuable patents, it was 
decided to analyse the patent families whose at least one member was applied at EPO 
(European Patent Office). This selection criteria was preferred to the analogue one of having a 
member applied at the USPTO (United States Patent and Trademark Office). This choice has 
been made considering that EPO applications for the Belgian universities give a more 
complete view of universities’ patenting strategy. 
 
The six most active patenting Belgian universities (KUL, UG, VUB, UCL, ULB, Ulg) have 
applied for 208 patent families (with a priority date ranging from 1985 to 1999) at the EPO. 
Among these, 78 EPO patents have also been applied for at the USPTO. Only seven other 
patents have been applied at USPTO without being applied at the EPO. The period of 
investigation ranges concern the priority dates going from 1985 to 1999. This selection is due 
to the patenting process and the constraints of the data collection. The choice of the upper 
bound (1999) can be explained by two facts. On the one hand, there is a delay between the 
reporting date of the application in a database and the application date at a patent office. On 
the other hand, the PCT (Patent Co-operation Treaty) procedure is increasingly used. This 
procedure allows the decision to extend internationally the rights of the patents to be delayed 
(delay of 30 months after the priority date). Therefore, as far as this paper is focused on EPO 
patents, the extension of the date field after 1999 creates the risk of missing patents that are 
not primarily applied at EPO but whose protection could be extended to EPO by the end of 
the PCT procedure. Before 1985, the patenting activities of the Belgian universities were 
limited, 9 patents were applied at the EPO (5 by UCL, 1 by Ulg and 3 by KUL).  
 
In what follows, unless specified, the use of the term “patent” will refer to patent family 
whose priority date is between 1985 and 1999 and of which one member at least has been 
applied at EPO. Table 3 presents the number of patent applications of the six Belgian 
universities over three 5 year-sub periods; the late eighties, the early nineties and the late 
nineties; and for the whole period ranging from 1985 to 1999. 
 
*** Insert table 3 around here *** 
 
There has been a spectacular growth of patent applications by Belgian universities. Actually, 
an increase of 44% has occurred between the late eighties period (1985-1989) and the early 
nineties period (1990-1994). This increase was followed by a huge growth of 264% that 
occurred between the early nineties and the late nineties (1995-1999). This evolution of the 
number of patent applications is more emphasized for the Flemish universities for which the 
first increase rate was 53% and the second was 322%, whereas the growth rates for the French 
speaking universities were respectively 33% and 181%. More recent data are not available for 
all universities for methodological reasons. However, it must be noticed that this tremendous 
increase has continued since 1999. The Brussels’ University (ULB), for instance, has applied 
for more than 30 patents since the year 2000, a larger number than all patents applied for 
during the 15 previous years. 
 
 
*** Insert table 4 around here *** 
                                                                                                                                                         
Leuven and REGA. These corrections have been implemented for the construction of our database. However, 
independent inventors and the patents invented in a university but applied by a firm were not taken into account.   8 
 
Table 4 displays the number of forward patent citations received by the patents applied for 
between 1985 and 1999. It shows that KUL at the present time is the university with the 
highest number of patents and the highest patent quality in average. Conversely, the 5-FPC 
index shows that patents at KUL are on average cited less rapidly than the patents of other 
universities.
 6  
 
On average, for the patents applied during the period 1985-1999, French-speaking universities 
received less citations overall than their Flemish counterparts but more within the five years 
following the priority date. However these facts hide other realities: the Flemish average is 
tremendously increased by the good results obtained by the KUL’s patents applied between 
1985 and 1994 (especially during the late eighties). The other Flemish university patents have 
been mainly applied during the late nineties, diminishing the probability to be already cited. 
Nevertheless, VUB’s patents seem to be very promising with an average number of 5-year 
forward patent citations close to that for the patents applied during the late nineties. Except 
for the VUB’s patents, the other recent Flemish patents (UG and KUL) are the ones with the 
smallest short-term (5 years) value determinants. 
 
*** Insert figure 2 around here *** 
 
Figure 2 shows that the well-known skewness of patent value distribution also holds for 
academic patents. Considering that value can be approximated by forward patent citations, 
this figure shows that among the 208 patent families applied by Belgian universities at EPO 
between 1985 and 1999, 140 patents weren’t referenced by any subsequent patent whereas 
only two received more than 30 patent citations. The next section presents the econometric 
model that aims at explaining this skewed value distribution of patents. 
 
 
5. Empirical  implementation 
 
 
To evaluate the value determinants of Belgian universities’ patents, different Poisson models 
are used. Since we don’t have the monetary value of the patents and according to conclusions 
drawn from the literature, the choice to approximate patent value by the number of forward 
citations was made. The choice of Poisson models - count models- relies on the fact that the 
value proxy was the number of forward patent citations: the used dependent variable was 
expressed as integers. 
 
Equation (1) presents the general form of Poisson model. 
 
X y Β =              ( 1 )  
 
Where y is the independent variable, Β, is the raw vector of the unknown parameters and X, is 
the column vector of the independent variables. The conditional density of y given x (an 














                                                 
6 More exhaustive descriptive statistics are available in annex 2.   9 
 
where  β  is the parameter associated with the explanatory variable x and m(x, β) is the 
conditional mean of the dependent variable y. The conditional density of FPC given any 
independent variable is supposed to follow a Poisson distribution. 
 
The dependent variable of our models is the number of all forward patent citations received 
from patents of any intellectual property office (FPC). This number wasn’t limited to the 
amount of forward citations received within the five years following the priority date because 
the delay between the priority date of the university patent and the filling date of the first 
patent citing the university was on average of about 6 years. 
 
The basic econometric model is described in equation (2). It is mainly based on the existing 
studies described in table 2. It includes three types of variables. The first one are the controle 
variables (CV). They mainly take into account the characteristics of the patent (the age of the 
patent, the number of inventor and whether it is in the biotech sector or not). The second type 
of variables are the value determinants (VD). They are composed of non patent citations, 
backward citations, the number of co-assignees and the family size. The third type of 
variables are the six main universities fixed effects (UNIV). As the universities have different 
endowments and processes to manage knowledge transfer. The estimates will confirm 
whether, taking into account the control variables and the value determinants, university 


















i m i UNIV VD CV FPC γ β α       ( 2 )  
 
where FPCi is the number of forward patent citations of each patent [i = 1,…, 208]. The 
vector of unknown parameter is [] 6 1 4 1 3 1 ,..., , ..., , ,..., γ γ β β α α . CV
m holds for m = 1 to 3: YEARS 
(the age of the patent since 1985), INV (the number of inventors involved in the patent) and 
BIO (whether the patent is in the biotech sector). VD
j holds for j=1 to 4 : FAM (the family 
size), BPC (backward patent citations), NPC (non patent citations), and COAS (the number of 
co-assignees. UNIV
k holds for k=1 to 6 (the six universities included in the present analysis: 
UCL, ULB, ULG, KUL, UG, VUB). The estimation strategy is first to estimate equation (2), 
as the basic model. In a second stage each value determinant is disaggregated into its various 
components, as described in section 3 and figure 1. 
 
Control variables (CV) 
 
Universities’ patents are not cited immediately after filling. It is assumed that the older a 
patent, the more forward patent citations it will receive. This time effect is taken into account 
by the variable YEARS. It is computed as the difference in years between the priority date of 
the patent and the year 1985 (lower bound of our sample). It is therefore expected to have a 
negative impact on our proxy of patent value. INV is the number of inventors involved in the 
invention codifies in a patent.  
 
The third control variable is BIO. The 208 patent families has been divided in two big 
technological fields: the biotechnological ones and the others
7. Table A4.1 in the appendix 
                                                 
7 To make the distinction between these two parts, we use the 4-digit IPC classifications. We have considered 
that a patent is part of the biotechnological field if its principal technological field is related to health, to 
environment, to organic chemistry or to biology. Annex 3 reports the related field for each 4-digit IPC classes 
that we have found in university’s patents.   10 
suggests that patents in the biotech sector have a higher probability to get at least one citation 
than the patent in the non biotech sector. Only 13 to 14 per cent of the patents that were 
applied in the late nineties have already at least one citation, whereas 85 percent of the biotech 
patents applied in the early nineties have received a citation. This last figure drops to 40 per 
cent for the non bio tech sector. Furthermore, an average of 2.57 patents has referenced a 
biotech university patent whereas only 0.8 patent has cited a non-biotech university patent.  
 
Value determinants (VD) 
 
The extent to which a patent is partly or fully based on scientific knowledge can be 
approximated with the number of non patent citations (NPC). Although the literature on 
patent value has not extensively used this variable, we incorporate it in the model. In addition, 
this variable has been disaggregated into two variables, as suggested in section 3: the number 
of citations to the inventors’ scientific papers (self citations) and the number of citations to 
other scientific papers (non self citations). However, the available data in the database creates 
a bias: the self-literature citations are underestimated and the non-self literature references 
overestimated. Actually, partial information is available, because for each literature citation, 
only the name of the first author is referenced in the database. These two variables may be 
more relevantly seen as the number of literature citations for which one of the inventors is the 
principal author
8 and as the number of references to papers for which none of the inventors is 
the first author. 
 
The second value determinant often used in the literature is the number of backward patent 
citations (BPC). According to our hypotheses, this variable can be disaggregated with respect 
to the institutional origin of cited patents. They have been clustered under three categories: the 
number of corporate applicants (firms or corporate R&D centres), the number of public 
institutional applicants (universities, hospitals, public research centres, state departments) and 
the number of self citations (citations to own previous inventions). The basic idea with this 
second approach is to test to what extent the quality and value of academic patents depends on 
the institutional origin of the invention. Most applicants of the backward patent citations are 
firms (53%)
9. A non-negligible proportion of these backward patent citations are citations to a 
university’s own previous patents (6%). 
 
To assess the impact of a collaboration between different knowledge generating institutions, 
the number of co-assignees applying with the university has been computed (COAS). Only 
juridical entities have been looked at. COAS is the total number of co-assignees. In a second 
stage these co-applicants have been disaggregated into three categories: the corporate co-
assignees (industries, corporate R&D centres), the international public co-assignees (non-
Belgian public entities like universities, hospitals, public research centres, state departments) 
and the national public co-assignees (Belgian public entities like other Belgian universities, 
hospitals, public research centres, state departments etc…).  
 
As suggested in the literature survey, family size (FAM) is one of the most relevant indicators 
of patent value. The variable takes into account the number of patents that are member of the 
family. The second approach is to disaggregate this information and to focus the analysis on 
                                                 
8 In health, life and engineering sciences, the first author of a scientific paper is usually the main researcher 
involved in the research described by the paper. 
9 It must be kept in mind that some of these ‘corporate’ patents might well have been invented in an academic 
research department.   11 
two variables describing whether the EPO universities’ patents are also applied at the JPO 
and/or at the USPTO. These variables take the value one if applicable. 
 
The analysis of the size of a patent family pinpoints the same difference: biotech patents are 
more likely to be applied abroad than the non-biotech ones. 78% of biotech patents applied 
between 1985 and 1994 at the EPO were also applied at the JPO, 67% of these patents were 
also applied at the USPTO. Globally, 56% of the EPO bio patents applied between 1985 and 
1994 were simultaneously applied at the JPO and the USPTO. These percentages fall 
respectively to 54%, 36% and 36% for the non-biotech patents. These statistics advocate that 
a patent applied in a biotech field is more likely to be cited than a patent in another technical 
field. To test this hypothesis, a dummy variable BIO is computed. This variable takes the 
value one when the patent technical field is biotechnology.  
 
All these variables are used consecutively in six variants of the basic model described in 
equation (2). Model 2 disaggregates the information contained in the number of non-patent 
citations. Model 3 disaggregates the information contained in the number of backward patent 
citations. Models 4 and 5 disaggregate the information contained in the number of co-
assignees. The information contained in the number of patent family members is 
disaggregated in Model 6. The last one, Model 8, presents the results with all value 
determinants disaggregated into their institutional origins.  
 
 
6. Empirical  results 
 
 
Table 5 (a and b) presents the econometric results of seven variants of the basic Poisson 
model defined in equation (2). All these models have the number of forward patent citations 
as dependent variable. Model 1, relies on a set of thirteen ‘basic’ variables to explain the 
number of forward citations received by each academic patent in Belgium between 1985 and 
1999. It includes the three control variables, four broad value determinants, and the 
universities’ fixed effects. The subsequent models aim at improving this first model through a 
more detailed approximation of the three sources of knowledge (NPC, BPC and COAS) and 
of the patenting strategy regarding the geographical scope for protection. 
 
The first column of table 5 shows that the age of a patent is positively correlated with its value. 
The difference between the priority date and 1985 has a significant negative influence on the 
number of received citations. The newer a patent, the more limited the probability to be 
already cited. The second control variable, the number of inventors (INV), has no impact on 
patent value, contrary to the conclusions of Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2000, 2002). This 
difference might be due to the fact that they use all patents applications at EPO – i.e., mainly 
corporate patents.
 10  The last control variable, BIO, has a positive and significant impact. This 
illustrates the rapid growth of research in the biotech sector, which yield more forward 
citations than the other sectors.  
 
*** Insert table 5 (a and b) around here *** 
 
                                                 
10  This study approximates the patent value by the number of received forward citations. In Guellec and van 
Pottelsberghe ’s study, this value is evaluated by looking whether the patent is granted or not. The insignificant 
impact in the present study might also be explained by the fact that most academic patents are invented by a 
team of researchers. Therefore, there is little heterogeneity in this variable.   12 
Amongst the value determinants, one can see that backward patent citations, the family size 
and the number of co-assignees have all a positive and highly significant impact on the value 
of patents. Non patent citations have no significant impact. This non significant result 
regarding the references to the scientific literature differs from the results of Harhoff et al. 
(2002). It might be due to the fact that all university patents have a strong tendency to cite the 
scientific literature. If this is the case, the NPC variable would not allow to differentiate the 
academic patents included in the database. University inventions are supposed to translate into 
more science-related patents than in the data set of Harhoff et al. (2002), which is mainly 
composed of patents applied by German business firms. This hypothesis is somewhat 
validated by the results of Harhoff and Reitzig (2002), who focus on biotech and 
pharmaceutical patents and do not observe any significant impact of non patent citations on 
their value indicator. It might also be that only university patents with a very large number of 
scientific references are more valuable. To validate this hypothesis, future verifications have 
to be performed, maybe through a quadratic model.  
 
Model 2 suggests that the issue at stake is not really the total number of non patent citations 
but rather the origin of these citations. Self citations (the number of citations to scientific 
papers whose first author is one of the inventors) have a positive and significant influence on 
patent value, whereas non-self citations to the scientific literature are associated with a 
negative and significant parameter. These results suggest that the universities’ most valuable 
patents are those for which the inventors (inventors who have successfully published in the 
field) master the related science base and decide to investigate further towards the 
crystallization of their tacit knowledge into technological inventions. 
 
A second important determinant of patent value is backward patent citations. Model 1 shows 
that it indeed positively correlates with patent value. Model 3 investigates further the 
mechanism through which backward citations affect value by looking at the institutional 
origin of the cited patents. As suggested in the new methodological framework depicted in 
figure 1, disaggregated information on backward citations induces a better fit of the number of 
forward citations. The results clearly show that patents citing former university patents 
invented by at least one similar researcher (citations to self) are significantly less cited. One 
explanation might be that self backward citations witness mainly an incremental invention 
rather than a breakthrough invention. When the cited patents are invented by public 
institutions they seem to be significant and positive determinant of patent value. A similar 
relation occurs when the cited patents have been invented by firms, but to a lower extent. The 
lower impact of backward citations to patents invented by firms might be due to a weaker 
scientific content in the invention. 
 
Model 1 also illustrates the positive impact of co-assignees on the number of forward patent 
citations. Similarly to non patent citations and backward citation we have investigated 
whether the institutional origin of the co-assignees affects this result. Model 4 shows that it is 
the case. Academic patents co-applied with either national or international public institutions 
are more likely to be cited.
11 In particular, the number of national public institutional co-
assignees has the most significant and positive impact on the number of forward citations. 
Usually in those kinds of research projects, public research institutions involve their own 
                                                 
11 Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2000, 2002) show that the success rate of EPO patent applications that are 
filed by more than one domestic applicant is lower than for the applications filed by one co-applicant, but if the 
co-applicants are from different countries, the probability is higher. The present results partly fit with theirs. The 
main difference is most probably due to the fact that Guellec and van pottelsberghe used all patent application at 
EPO, which originate from the business sector.   13 
researchers. Proximity might explain why national co-operations seem to be more fruitful than 
international ones. It allows for closer and stronger links between researchers and would 
therefore induce a more active cooperation. Patents that have been applied jointly with a firm 
do not seem to be associated with a significantly higher (or lower) number of forward 
citations than the average academic patent. Co-assignation with an enterprise sometimes does 
not reveal scientific co-operation but only the commitments of a research contract sharing the 
ownership of intellectual rights between the university (the research partner) and the industry 
(the financial partner). 
 
We noticed that several academic patents (originating from Flemish universities) have been 
applied jointly with IMEC.
 12 This public institution has been created by the Flemish Region 
as a consortium between the various academic departments specialised in information 
technology. It mainly aims at fostering university-industry knowledge transfer, by providing 
technical support and expertise in the field. The advantage of such an institution is that it is 
specialized in one field (information technology) and provides skilled support to several 
academic institutions. The estimates presented in model 5 suggest that the patents that have 
been applied jointly with IMEC are associated with a larger number of forward citations than 
the patents that have been applied jointly with another Belgian public institution (generally an 
academic institution). However this difference is not statistically significant. 
 
The fourth indicator of patent value relates to the family size. In line with the findings of most 
existing findings Model 1 shows that the size of patent family is an important determinant of 
patent value. However, as argued in section three, some ‘members’ of a family might provide 
a more precise approximation of patent value. This idea is validated by Model 6. It shows that 
that an application at the JPO and/or at the USPTO has a positive and significant impact on 
the probability of a patent to be referenced by a subsequent one; especially the application at 
the USPTO, which is one of the most relevant predictors of the patent value, at least for 
Belgian academic inventions. This result is consistent with those obtained by Guellec and van 
Pottelsberghe (2000). They found that amongst all the patent applications at EPO, those that 
had a sound geographical strategy (the designation of a few European countries for 
protection) had a significantly higher probability to be granted. 
 
Model 7 presents the estimates of the basic model with simultaneously disaggregated value 
determinants of the number of forward patent citations. The estimates are very close those of 
Models 2 to 6, and therefore reinforce the robustness of the results presented in the previous 
models. We also performed several regressions of Model 1 and Model 7 with only five 
universities (we consecutively dropped one university from the sample). The estimated 
parameters were stable (the results are available on request). 
 
Since self backward citations have a negative and significant impact on the number of 
forward citations a patent receives one could logically wonder whether the dependent variable 
should be neat of ‘self’ forward citations. Indeed, many inventors might prefer to see their 
inventions to be cited more by other inventors than by themselves. Models 8 to 13 in table 5 
aim at testing whether the institutional origin of FPC affects the empirical results. We use as 
dependent variable either the total number of forward citations, or the non-self forward 
citations or the forward citations exclusively made by firms. The estimates with the traditional 
                                                 
12   IMEC (Interuniversity MicroElectronics Center) is an independent research centre in the field of 
microelectronics, nanotechnology, based in Flanders. Between 1985-1999, IMEC has co-applied 6 patents with 
VUB (on a total of 9 non-biotech patents), 7 patents with UG (on a total of 13 non-biotech patents) and 2 with 
KUL (on a total of 12 non-biotech patents)   14 
variables are very stable. All the parameters keep their size and significance, except for the 
family size variable, which is no more significant with non-self FPC and corporate FPC. The 
results are also stable with the disaggregated model that includes the new variables (Models 
11 to 13). The only difference occurs with self non-patent citations (no more significant) and 
the application in the Japanese Patent Office or the USPTO. 
 
One might also wonder whether the recent growth in patent applications by Belgian 
universities witnesses a surge in innovative activity, or whether it merely reflects a higher 
propensity to patent innovations of lower quality or value. In the USA, Henderson et al. 
(1998) show that patenting by universities has risen dramatically in the last 25 years and that 
this increase is clearly associated with an overall increase in university attention to 
commercial applications of technology. However, they also notice that “despite the 
approximate doubling in the total number of patents after 1980 [ Bayh-Dole Act], there is no 
increase in the number of very important patents” and suggest that “their results could reflect 
either a change in the internal research culture of the US universities that makes scientists 
and engineers get involved in more applied research with less significant patents or the 
effects of entry into patenting after 1980 by institutions with little experience and expertise in 
patenting”.  
 
These last conclusions are however criticized by Mowery et al. (2001a, 2001b, 2002) and 
Sampat et al. (2003). They argue that there is a truncation bias in Henderson’s data and 
observe that universities with substantial pre-1980 patenting experience display no decline in 
importance and generality of their patents after 1980. They conclude that “any changes in the 
characteristics of the U.S. university patents after 1980 are due in large part to entry, rather 
than to changes in university culture.” [Mowery et al., 2001b – Page 1] They also stress that 
university patenting experience and learning aspects are key elements for applying important 
patents. 
 
The university characteristics presented in the seven models of table 5 seem to confirm this 
latter argument. For instance, the university that has had the largest increase in patenting 
activity is the KUL. Its fixed effect in most regressions is an intermediate position which is 
not significantly different from those of the other five universities. We cannot conclude, 
therefore, that the recent surge in patenting activity by Belgian universities witnesses a higher 
propensity to patent inventions of lower value. It would rather suggest that it reflects a higher 




                                                 
13 Model 7 is the only one where the university effects seem to be significantly different for some universities. 
However it is difficult to know whther the difference is due to potential multicollinearity biases (due to the high 
number of explanatory variables) or whether it is due to heterogeneous effectiveness of knowledge transfer 
management, as suggested by Mowery et al. (2001b) for American universities.   15 
7.  Concluding remarks  
 
 
The intended contribution of this paper to the existing literature on patent value was twofold. 
It first aimed at improving the traditional determinants of patent value. The second objective 
was to test the validity of these new indicators as determinants of patent value for academic 
patents. 
 
Regarding the methodological framework, the novelty consists in a desaggregation of the 
existing traditional determinants into the institutional origins of scientific and technological 
knowledge. The scientific knowledge base, which is approximated by the number of non 
patent citations can be disentangled into self and non-self citations to the scientific literature. 
The technological knowledge, usually approximated by the number of backward patent 
citations, can be disentangled into the institutional origin of the cited patents. Potential 
collaboration between different institutions can be disentangled into the type of collaborative 
institutions. Finally, we put forward that an alternative to the family size of a patent can be 
approximated by simply taking into account some of the largest ‘homogenous’ market 
targeted for protection, like the United States and Japan (from a European viewpoint). 
 
The traditional structural form of the determinants of patent value and the new determinants 
put forward have been tested on the academic patents applied by six major Belgian 
universities. The patent value indicator that is used is the number of forward patent citations. 
The empirical results confirm the traditional results of previous analyses on corporate patents 
and validate them for Belgian university patents. Controlling for its age and its technological 
field, the most important value determinants of a patent are its family size and the number of 
backward patent citations. As far as academic patents are concerned, the presence of a co-
assignee also seems to improve the patent value. This is probably due to an effective 
collaboration or an improved selection process. Another specificity of academic patents is that 
the total number of non patent citations does not seem to be an indicator of patent value. This 
last result might be due to the fact that most academic patents have a strong propensity to cite 
the scientific literature.  
 
However, when these traditional indicators of patent value are disentangled according to their 
institutional origin, some interesting results appear. Regarding the citations to the scientific 
literature, the results suggest that the issue at stake is not really the total number of non patent 
citations but rather the origin of these citations. Self citations (the number of citations to 
scientific papers whose first author is one of the inventors) are a positive and significant 
indicator of patent value, as opposed to non-self citations. In other words, some of the 
universities’ most valuable patents are those for which the inventors attempt to investigate 
further towards the crystallization of their tacit knowledge into technological inventions. 
 
Similarly, the disaggregated information on backward patent citations induces a better fit of 
the number of forward citations. The results clearly show that self backward patent citations 
are associated with a lower patent value, as opposed to the backward citations to patents that 
have been invented by a public research institution or, to a lower extent, by a firm. The 
negative impact of self backward patent citations is probably due to the fact that these patents 
witness mainly an incremental invention. 
 
Academic patents co-applied with either national or international public institutions are more 
likely to be cited. The number of national public co-assignees has the most significant and   16 
positive impact on the number of forward citations. This might be the results of an active 
collaboration between public institutions that have a strong scientific knowledge base. 
Academic patents that have been applied jointly with a firm do not seem to be associated with 
a significantly higher (or lower) number of forward citations than the average academic patent. 
The identification of some ‘members’ of a patent family also provides a more precise 
approximation of patent value. When a patent is applied at the JPO and/or at the USPTO, it is 
associated with a higher value than the other patents.  
 
All these results stay quite stable when the dependent variable, total forward citations, is 
replaced by non-self forward citations or by corporate forward citations. 
 
Several policy implications emerge from the improved indicators of patent value put forward 
in the present paper. The first one is related to the highly significant and positive impact of 
self citations to the scientific literature. This result clearly shows that when a patent is 
invented by a researcher who uses its own scientific and tacit knowledge, it crystallizes into a 
potentially higher economic value. That is, the current policies aiming at fostering knowledge 
transfer from the university to the industry should try to stimulate the academic researchers 
with a high scientific profile in terms of publications. Second, academic patents emerging 
from collaboration with a local or a foreign public research organisation are associated with a 
significantly higher value than other academic patents. This result validates the current 
Belgian Federal S&T policy (as well as the 6
th Framework Programme implemented by the 
EC Directorate General for Research at the EU-wide level) that consists in fostering 
institutional collaboration. Third, a sound patenting strategy that consists in targeting the 
United States and Japan, seem to be a powerful predictor of patent value. 
   17 
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9. Annex  1 
 
 
FPMs    : Faculté Polytechnique de Mons 
UMH   :  Université  Mons-Hainaut 
FUL    : Fondation Universitaire Luxembourgeoise 
FUSL    : Facultés Universitaires St Louis 
FUNDP  : Facultés Universitaires Notre Dame de la Paix 
FUSAGx  : Faculté Universitaire des Sciences Agronomiques de Gembloux 
Ulg    : Université de Liège 
ULB    : Université Libre de Bruxelles 
UCL    : Université Catholique de Louvain 
LUC    : Limburgs Universitair Centrum   
UA    : Universiteit Antwerpen (groups the 4 Antwerpen university institutions UA, 
UIA, UFSIA, RUCA) 
VUB    : Vrije Universiteit Brussel 
UG    : Universiteit Gent 
KUL    : Katholiek Universiteit Leuven 
KUB    : Katholiek Universiteit Brussel   
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10.  Annex 2: Descriptive statistics on indicators of patent value by university 
 
11. Annex 3 
 














*  C01F N  F21V N 
A01K   B  C04B  N  G01B  N 
A01M B  C07B  B  G01F  B 
A23K B  C07C  B  G01J  N 
A23L B  C07D B  G01L N 
A61B B  C07F  B  G01N B/N
** 
A61F B  C07H B  G02B N 
A61K   B  C07K  B  G06F  N 
A61L B  C08F  B  G06T N 
A61M B  C08G  B  G10K  N 
A61N B  C08L  B  G21K N 
B01D B  C10L  N  H01L  N 
B01F N  C11B B  H01Q N 
B01J N  C12N B  H01S N 
B09C B  C12P  B  H03F  N 
B26F N  C12Q B  H03K N 
B29C N  C22B N  H04B N 
B29D N  C23C  N  H04J  N 
B31D N  C25D N  H04L  N 
B32B N  D03D N  H05H N 
B62D N       
* B : biotechnology field; N: non biotechnology field 
** The IPC class G01N is a class linked to instrumentation apparatus related to the investigation or 
the analysis of materials by determining their chemical or physical properties. We have 
considered here that the patent within this classification could be a biotech patent or not. To 
determine in which field it should occur. We have looked at the others listed IPC codes. If they 
were biotechnology classes (as defined in the table). the patent was considered to be applied in the 
biotech field. Otherwise. the patent was considered to be a non biotech patent.   22 
12. Annex 4: Descriptive statistics of determinants of patent value by technological fields 
 
Table A4.1 : Descriptive statistics : Percentage of patents cited at least once by technological field and 
application priority period 
 
Percentage of patents having received at least one 
forward citation 
Biotechnological  field  Others  technological 
fields 
1985-1989
*  66.7% 50% 
1990-1994
* 85.3%  40% 
1995-1999
* 13%  14.3% 
     * Priority Date of the university patents 
     Biotech field : 1985-1989 : 21 patents   1990-1994: 34 patents 1995-1999: 100 patents 
     Non-Bio field: 1985-1989 : 6  patents   1990-1994: 5 patents   1995-1999: 42 patents 
     Source: own calculations based on Delphion database information 
 
 
Table A4.2 : Descriptive statistics : Percentage of patents applied at the JPO and at the USPTO by 
technological field and application priority period 
 













Applied at JPO 
& USPTO 
1985-1989
*  71.4%  52.4% 42.9% 66.7%  33.3% 33.3% 
1990-1994
*  82.4%  76.5% 64.7% 40.0%  40.0% 40.0% 
1995-1999
*  28.0%  24.0% 17.0% 33.3%  31.0% 16.7% 
* Priority Date 
Biotech field : 1985-1989 : 21 patents   1990-1994: 34 patents 1995-1999: 100 patents 
Non-Bio field: 1985-1989 : 6  patents   1990-1994: 5 patents   1995-1999: 42 patents 
Source own calculations based on Delphion database information 
 
 
Table A4.3 :  Descriptive statistics : Number of citations per university patent by technological field  
Fields  # Backward citations 
per application 
# Forward citations 
per application 
#  Forward citations 
per application within 
5 years after the 
priority date 
Percentage of EP 
application with at 
least 1 forward 
citation 
# Non patent citations 
per application 
Biotechnology  2.66 2.57 0.20 36.1%  4.02 
Others  2.85 0.80 0.28 20.8%  1.25 
Total  2.71 2.12 0.22 32.2%  3.31 
208 family patents whose priority dates are comprised between 1985-1999 
Biotech field:  155 patents  Other technical fields: 53 patents 
  Source: own calculations based on Delphion database information 
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13. Annex 5: Descriptive statistics on backward patent citations  
 
Table A5.1 : Descriptive statistics: Type of assignees of the backward patent citations of the Belgian university patents applied between 1985-1999 
 
 








































1985-1989  4.33  1.09  45.3%  5.5% 28.1%  0.0% 7.8% 0.8% 12.5% 
1990-1994  4.71  1.15  54.5%  5.7% 20.4%  0.0% 9.0% 0.9% 9.5% 
1995-1999  1.84  1.12  55.8%  9.5% 12.6%  0.3% 3.7% 0.3% 17.7% 
1985-1999  2.71  1.12  53.2%  7.4% 18.3%  0.2% 6.3% 0.6% 13.9% 
0 BPC : Backward  patent citations 
1 Individuals are considered as an unique assignee 
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Table 1 : Literature on patent value 
 
        Authors  Field  Sample  Model  Dep. Variable
 
SCHANKERMAN   
and PAKES  (1986) 
Post 1950 period, 
UK, German and French patents 
778 -  Stochastic  model   - Patent renewal 
TRAJTENBERG (1990)   Computed Tomography 
 (1972-1984) 
456    - Patent citations may be indicative 
of the value of innovation 
 
- Close association between citation-
based patent indices and 
independent measures of the social 
value of innovation 
LERNER  (1994)  Biotechnology (1973-92),  
USPTO patents 
1678  - PROBIT  - # Citations  
LANJOUW J. et al. (1996)  Precedent data and  
results of the authors 
    - # Years a patent is renewed and 
size protection are indicators of 
patent value 
 
LANJOUW  and  
SCHANKERMAN  (1997) 
USPTO 1975-1991  5452  - PROBIT  Probability of infringement and 
challenge suits  
LANJOUW  (1998)  Computers, textiles,  
combustion engines  
and pharmaceuticals  
West German patents  
(1955-88) 
20000 -Dynamic  stochastic 
discrete choice model 
- Renewal decision 
HARHOFF  et al. (1999)  German and US patents  
(1977 expiring 1995) 
994  - OLS regression 
- Negative binomial 
- Forward citations 
LANJOUW  and  
SCHANKERMAN  (1999) 
Pharmaceutical; chemicals; 
electronic; mechanical  
US patents (1960-91)  
8000 -Latent  variable  Model 
for a composite measure 
of quality 
 
- PROBIT for probability 
of renewal and litigation 
 
- Composite index 
- Renewal  
- Litigation 
GUELLEC,  
van POTTELSBERGHE  (2000) 
EPO 1985-1992  23487  - PROBIT   - Grant of a patent 
SHANE  (2001)  MIT patents 1980-1996  8420  - Cox regression  - Creation of new firm  
HARHOFF  and 
REITZIG  (2002) 
Biotechnology  
and pharmaceutics  
EPO (1979-1996) 
13389  - PROBIT   - Opposition 
HARHOFF  et al. (2002)  German patents  
(1977 expiring 1995 ) 
772  - Ordered PROBIT  - Monetary patent value  
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Table 2 : Determinants of patent value 
 
  Patent Value  Patenting Procedure   Patent characteristics  Others 





SCHANKERMAN   
and PAKES  (1986) 
        D °                      
LERNER    (1994)            D
       +     +     
LANJOUW  and  
SCHANKEMAN  (1997) 
    D       +  +   +  -        +  * 
LANJOUW  (1998)            D°                       
HARHOFF  et al.  (1999)  +          D            *       
LANJOUW  and  
SCHANKERMAN  (1999) 
  D        +  +   +   +  *       
LANJOUW  and  
SCHANKEMAN  (1999) 
       D    + +    /    +  *       
LANJOUW and  
SCHANKERMAN (1999) 
    D       +  /   /   +  *       
GUELLEC ,  
van POTTELSBERGHE  
(2000, 2002) 
       D             -  +    +  +  + 
SHANE  (2001)           D  +       +   *  +    * 
HARHOFF and 
REITZIG  (2002) 
    D       +  / /    - +  *    *  * 
HARHOFF  et al. (2002)  D    +  +        +  +  +    /  +         
CONCLUSIONS +    +  +        +  +  (+)  (+)  (+/-)  +  *  +  *  * 
PV: Monetary patent Value; QI : quality index; OP: opposition/ litigation procedure; AP annulment procedure; RP Renewal data; GP: Granting of patent application; FC : 
Firm creation. FPC: Forward Patent citations; BPC : Backward Patent citations; NPC: Non Patent citations. The signs inside the table are D: Dependent variable; +: Positive 
and significant impact of the explanatory variable on the dependant one; - :Negative and significant impact of the explanatory variable on the dependant one; / :No significant 
impact of the explanatory variable on the dependant one. * :The variable description hides a set of manifold variables. Among those, some may have a positive or a negative 
impact and others may have no significant impact on the dependent variable. ° :Model of patent renewal decision is constructed around the following variables: legal fees, 
renewal fees, annual return and expected future value 
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Patent Family Size 
 
(# Family members) 
Backward Patent  
Citations 
 












of   
patent value 
Patent protection  New determinants 
- Protection at USPTO (+) 
- Protection at JPO (+) 
Scientific Knowledge  Technical Knowledge 
Cooperation 
New determinants 
- Self NPC citations (+)  
- Non-self NPC citations (-) 
New determinants 
 
- Industry (?) 
- International PRI (+) 
- National PRI (+) 
 
New determinants 
- Industry (?) 
- PRI (+) 
- Self citations (-) 
 
1. The sign between parentheses indicates the expected relative impact of each characteristic associated with the 
main indicator (relative to the average impact of the main indicator). PRI = public research institution. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of number of EPO patents of Belgian universities
1 








  9  3  0 14 1  0 12  15  27 
1990-1994  7  7  2 18 3  2 16  23  39 
1995-1999  14 18 13 55 25 17 45 97  142 
1985-1999  30 28 15 87 29 19 73  135  208 
1. Sources: Delphion website and own calculations. * French-speaking universities (sum of EPO patent 
applications of UCL, ULB, Ulg); ** Flemish universities (sum of EPO patent applications of KUL, UG, VUB); 
all statistics are by priority date. 
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Table 4 : Forward patent citations of Belgian universities (priority date: 1985-1999) 
Priority date : 1985-
1999 
UCL  ULB ULg KUL UG VUB  Fr.  Univ.






Number  of  patents 30  28 15 87 29 19 73  135  208 
Average number of 
FPC per application
1 
2.37  1.32 1.33 3.25 0.34 1.05 1.75 2.32 2.12 
Average number of  
5-FPC per application
2 
0.33  0.25 0.27 0.09 0.10 0.74 0.29 0.19 0.22 
1. * French-speaking universities (sum of EPO patent applications of UCL, ULB, Ulg); 
** Flemish universities 
(sum of EPO patent applications of KUL, UG, VUB). 2 FPC: Forward patent citations. 3. 5-FPC: Forward patent 
citations received within the 5 years after priority date. Sources: Delphion website and own calculations 
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Source: Number of forward citations, as of July 2002, own calculation, and Delphion database.   30 
Table 5: Econometric results 
Dependent variable: number of forward patent citations  POISSON  MODEL 
Explanatory variables  Model 1  Std. Err.  Model 2  Std. Err.  Model 3  Std. Err.  Model 4  Std. Err. 
Control variables           
# Years since 1985  - 0.281
***  0.018 -  0.286
*** 0.018 -0.273
*** 0.018 -  0.301
*** 0.019 
# Inventors  - 0.0052  0.038  - 0.0073  0.038  -0.031  0.038  - 0.010  0.040 
Biotechnological field  0.667




           
Non-patent citations           
# Non-patent citations (Total)  - 0.0058  0.006      -0.023
*** 0.008 -  0.013
*** 0.007 
    # Self non-patent citations      0.031
*  0.016      
    #Non-self non-patent citations      - 0.014
***  0.007      
           
Backward patent citations           
# Backward patent citations (Total)  0.102
*** 0.011  0.105
*** 0.011      0.094
*** 0.011 
     # Corporate applicants of cited patents          0.096
*** 0.017     
     # Public applicants of cited patents          0.205
*** 0.032     
     # Self patent backward  citations        -0.214
*** 0.050     
           
Co-assignees           
# Co-assignees (Total)  0.191
*** 0.058  0.197
*** 0.058 0.164
*** 0.061     
    # Corporate co-assignees              0.183     0.179 
    # International public co-assignees              0.722
*** 0.129 
    # National public co-assignees              1.238
*** 0.249 
           IMEC as co-assignee (equal 1 if relevant)                 
           Other national public co-assignees                 
           
Family size           
Family size (# different applications)  0.020
*** 0.007  0.021
*** 0.007 0.029
*** 0.007  0.0094  0.007 
     Application at JPO (equal 1 if relevant)                 
     Application at USPTO (equa l   1   i f   r e l e v a n t )            
           
University characteristics           
UCL  (equal 1 if UCL is the applicant)  1.223




ULB  (equal 1 if ULB is the applicant)  1.393




ULG  (equal 1 if ULG is the applicant)  1.437




KUL  (equal 1 if KUL is the applicant)  1.279




UG    (equal 1 if UG is the applicant)  1.125




VUB (equal 1 if VUB is the applicant)  1.970




Levels of significance: * : < 10% **: <5%  ***: < 1%     Number of observations: 208 patent families applied between 1985-1999 at EPO 
Model 1:  Wald chi2(13) = 2654  Log likelihood = -325   Model 2: Wald chi2(14) = 2643  Log likelihood = -322 
Model 3:  Wald chi2(15) = 2686  Log likelihood = -327  Model 4:  Wald chi2(15) = 2751  Log likelihood = -307    31 
 
Levels of significance: * : < 10% **: <5%  ***: < 1%     Number of observations: 208 patent families applied between 1985-1999 at EPO 
Model 5: Wald chi2(16) = 2759  Log likelihood = -307   Model 6: Wald chi2(14) = 2559  Log likelihood = -317 
Model 7: Wald chi2(20) = 2742  Log likelihood = -29 
 
 
Dependent variable: number of forward patent citations  POISSON  MODEL 
Explanatory variables  Model 5  Std. Err.  Model 6  Std. Err.  Model 7  Std. Err. 
Control variables         
# Years since 1985  -0.298
*** 0.019  -  0.291
*** 0.016 -0.291
*** 0.017 
# Inventors  -0.014  0.040  - 0.0004  0.037  -0.045  0.040 
Biotechnological field  0.756
*** 0.215  0.693
*** 0.188 0.668
*** 0.222 
         
Non-patent citations          
# Non-patent citations (Total)  -0.013
**  0.007 -  0.0046 0.006     
    # Self non-patent citations        0.031
* 0.018 
    #Non-self non-patent citations        -0.041
*** 0.010 
         
Backward patent citations          
# Backward patent citations (Total)  0.095
*** 0.011  0.074
*** 0.012     
     # Corporate applicants of cited patents          0.050
*** 0.019 
     # Public applicants of cited patents          0.203
*** 0.037 
     # Self patent backward  citations        -0.183
*** 0.050 
         
Co-assignees          
# Co-assignees (Total)      0.180
*** 0.059     
    # Corporate co-assignees  0.205  0.179      0.301
* 0.181 
    # International public co-assignees  0.699
*** 0.130      0.474
*** 0.145 
    # National public co-assignees             
           IMEC as co-assignee (equal 1 if relevant)  1.628
*** 0.422      1.469
*** 0.433 
           Other national public co-assignees  1.038
*** 0.316      0.864
*** 0.315 
         
Family size         
Family size (# different applications)  0.010  0.007         
     Application at JPO (equal 1 if relevant)      0.255
* 0.141 0.305
** 0.149 
     Application at USPTO (equal 1 if relevant)      0.995
*** 0.169 0.981
*** 0.171 
         
University characteristics         
UCL  (equal 1 if UCL is the applicant)  1.151
*** 0.243  0.612
** 0.247 0.495
* 0.268 
ULB  (equal 1 if ULB is the applicant)  1.579
*** 0.288  0.794
** 0.311 1.273
*** 0.329 
ULG  (equal 1 if ULG is the applicant)  1.650
*** 0.384  0.812
** 0.388 1.247
*** 0.411 
KUL  (equal 1 if KUL is the applicant)  1.318
*** 0.  277  0.818
*** 0.278 1.043
*** 0.303 
UG    (equal 1 if UG is the applicant)  0.839
** 0.427  0.750
* 0.418 0.493  0.449 
VUB (equal 1 if VUB is the applicant)  1.764
*** 0.420  1.446
*** 0.371 1.107
** 0.445   32 
Dependent variable: number of forward patent citations (by type)  POISSON  MODEL 
Explanatory variables  Model 8  Std. Err.  Model 9  Std. Err.  Model 10  Std. Err. 
  FPC    Non-Self FPC    Corp FPC   
Control variables           
# Years since 1985  - 0.281
***  0.018 -0.277
*** 0.018  -0.267
***  0.021    
# Inventors  - 0.0052  0.038  0.0054     0.038        0.015     0.045       
Biotechnological field  0.667
***  0.184 0.658
***  0.186        0.512
**  0.221      
           
Non-patent citations           
# Non-patent citations (Total)  - 0.0058  0.006  -0.0059     0.0062       -0.001     0.007      
# Self non-patent citations             
#Non-self  non-patent  citations           
           
Backward patent citations           
# Backward patent citations (Total)  0.102
*** 0.011  0.112
***  0.011        0.108
***  0.013       
# Corporate applicants of cited patents             
# Public applicants of cited patents             
# Self patent backward citations             
           
Co-assignees           
# Co-assignees (Total)  0.191
*** 0.058  0.186
***  0.060        0.155
**  0.072       
# Corporate co-assignees             
# International public co-assignees             
# National public co-assignees             
           
Family size           
Family size (# different applications)  0.020
***  0.007  0.003     0.0075        0.004         0.0084       
Application at JPO (equal 1 if relevant)             
Application at USPTO (equal 1 if relevant)             
           
University characteristics           
UCL  (equal 1 if UCL is the applicant)  1.223
*** 0.220  1.296
***  0.223        0.729
***  0.274       
ULB  (equal 1 if ULB is the applicant)  1.393
*** 0.266  1.351
***  0.271        1.079
***  0.321       
ULG  (equal 1 if ULG is the applicant)  1.437
*** 0.355  1.402
***  0.356        1.348
***  0.405       
KUL  (equal 1 if KUL is the applicant)  1.279
*** 0.248  1.196
***  0.253        1.021
***  0.302       
UG    (equal 1 if UG is the applicant)  1.125
*** 0.399  1.034 
**  0.414        0.931
**  0.460       
VUB (equal 1 if VUB is the applicant)  1.970
*** 0.357  1.230
***  0.374        1.633
***  0.430       
Levels of significance: * : < 10% **: <5%  ***: < 1%     Number of observations: 208 patent families applied between 1985-1999 at EPO 
  Model 8:  Wald chi2(13) = 2654   Log likelihood = -325       Model 9: Wald chi2(13) = 1701  Log likelihood = -319     
  Model 10:  Wald chi2(13) = 1061   Log likelihood = -279   
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Dependent variable: number of forward patent citations (by type)  POISSON  MODEL 
Explanatory variables  Model 11  Std. Err.  Model 12  Std. Err.  Model 13  Std. Err. 
  FPC    Non-Self FPC    Corpor. FPC   
Control variables           
# Years since 1985  -0.293
***  0.017  -0.276***      0.018      -0.286***     0.021     
# Inventors  -0.041  0.040  -0.038     0.040       -0.048    0.048     
Biotechnological field  0.549
***  0.190  0.517***     0.191        0.533**     0.224       
           
Non-patent citations           
# Non-patent citations (Total)             
# Self non-patent citations  0.031
*  0.018  0.024     0.021        0.031     0.022      
#Non-self non-patent citations  -0.040
***  0.010  -0.040***     0.011       -0.032***     0.012     
           
Backward patent citations           
# Backward patent citations (Total)             
# Corporate applicants of cited patents  0.047
**  0.019  0.068***     0.020        0.100***    0.022       
# Public applicants of cited patents  0.201
***  0.037  0.221***     0.040       0.204***     0.047       
# Self patent backward citations  -0.183
***  0.050  -0.264***     0.056       -0.232***     0.063      
           
Co-assignees           
# Co-assignees (Total)             
# Corporate co-assignees  0.282
(*)  0.181  0.357**     0.182        0.533***     0.203       
# International public co-assignees  0.491
***  0.144  0.363**     0.155        0.134     0.187       
# National public co-assignees  1.064
***  0.249  0.962***     0.253        1.146***     0.280 
           
Family size           
Family size (# different applications)             
Application at JPO (equal 1 if relevant)  0.269
*  0.145  0.182     0.149        0.462**     0.185       
Application at USPTO (equal 1 if relevant)  0.978
***  0.171  0.825***     0.179        0.378*      0.204       
           
University characteristics           
UCL  (equal 1 if UCL is the applicant)  0.576
**  0.254  0.657***     0.255        0.175      0.309       
ULB  (equal 1 if ULB is the applicant)  1.391
***  0.305  1.338***     0.309        0.968***      0.367       
ULG  (equal 1 if ULG is the applicant)  1.385
***  0.387  1.293***     0.389        1.116**    0.446 
KUL  (equal 1 if KUL is the applicant)  1.117
***  0.273  1.142***     0.275        1.026***      0.324       
UG    (equal 1 if UG is the applicant)  0.662
(*)  0.419  0.583     0.429        0.566      0.471       
VUB (equal 1 if VUB is the applicant)  1.376
***  0.366  1.230***     0.374        1.117***      0.430       
Levels of significance: * : < 10% **: <5%  ***: < 1%     Number of observations: 208 patent families applied between 1985-1999 at EPO 
Model 11:  Wald chi2(19) = 2741   Log likelihood = -297       Model 12: Wald chi2(18) = 1775  Log likelihood = -301  
Model 13:  Wald chi2(19) = 1056  Log likelihood = -268   34 
 